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Abstract
We introduce a new malware detector – Shape-GD–
that aggregates per-machine detectors into a robust
global detector. Shape-GD is based on two insights: 1.
Structural: actions such as visiting a website (waterhole
attack) by nodes correlate well with malware spread, and
create dynamic neighborhoods of nodes that were ex-
posed to the same attack vector. However, neighbor-
hood sizes vary unpredictably and require aggregating an
unpredictable number of local detectors’ outputs into a
global alert. 2. Statistical: feature vectors correspond-
ing to true and false positives of local detectors have
markedly different conditional distributions – i.e. their
shapes differ. The shape of neighborhoods can iden-
tify infected neighborhoods without having to estimate
neighborhood sizes – on 5 years of Symantec detectors’
logs, Shape-GD reduces false positives from ∼1M down
to ∼110K and raises alerts 345 days (on average) be-
fore commercial anti-virus products; in a waterhole at-
tack simulated using Yahoo web-service logs, Shape-GD
detects infected machines when only ∼100 of ∼550K
are compromised.
1 Introduction
Behavioral detectors are a crucial line of defense
against malware. By extracting features out of net-
work packets [37, 58, 64, 76], system calls [23, 52,
41, 54, 63, 71, 36], instruction set [39, 27], and hard-
ware [30, 66, 45] level actions, behavioral detectors train
machine learning algorithms to classify program binaries
and executions as either malicious or benign. In prac-
tice, enterprises extensively deploy behavioral detectors
as per-machine local detectors whose alerts are analyzed
by an enterprise-wide global detector [2, 3, 11, 8, 33, 9].
Our goal is to design a robust global detector that com-
poses weak local detectors in a noisy community.
Behavioral detectors are weak – i.e., have high false
positives and negatives – because a large class of mal-
ware includes benign-looking behaviors, such as en-
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Figure 1: (L to R) Each circle is a node that runs a local
malware detector (LD). Our goal is to create a robust
global detector (GD) from weak LDs. We observe that
nodes naturally form neighborhoods based on attributes
relevant to attack vectors – e.g., all client devices that
visit a website W within the last hour belong to neighbor-
hood NBw. We propose a new GD that groups together
suspicious local feature vectors based on neighborhoods
– traditional GDs only analyze local alerts while we re-
analyze feature vectors that led to the alerts. Our GD
then exploits a new insight – the conditional distribution
of true positive feature vectors differs from false positive
feature vectors – to robustly classify neighborhoods as
malicious.
crypting users’ data, use of obfuscated code, or making
HTTP requests. Further, machine learning-based detec-
tors have been shown to be susceptible to evasion at-
tacks [74, 65, 57] that either increase false negatives or
force detectors to output more false positives. In practice,
global detectors in enterprises with ∼100K local detec-
tors have to process millions of alerts per day [4] which
stresses heavy-weight program analyses and human ana-
lysts who investigate the final alerts [7].
Furthermore, local detector communities are noisy,
where local machines often fail to report alerts or re-
port them (often, months) late [18, 1]. This noise is be-
cause machines often go out of network access, users
decline to send reports, etc. Enterprise settings are
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also noisy because attacks might target local machines
in unpredictable ways – in a ‘waterhole’ attack [17]
(where a compromised webpage spreads malicious code
to machines in the enterprise), a malicious javascript-
advertisement might be targeted by an ad-broker to only
a fraction of visitors to a set of webpages; the specific ex-
ploit might only succeed on a small fraction of recipient
machines because of browser versions or patching status
or human-user actions, etc.
Challenges for prior global detectors. Boosting weak
detectors using purely machine learning techniques is
challenging. The dominant approaches are (a) clus-
tering: combine feature vectors using some distance
metric to identify suspicious clusters of feature vec-
tors [72, 75, 77, 55], and (b) counting: train local detec-
tors (LDs) such as Random Forest or gradient-boosted
trees to generate local alerts, and generate a global alert
if there is a significant fraction of local alerts in the enter-
prise [29, 38, 37, 60]. Both approaches have limitations
that force enterprises to deploy brittle rule-sets that ex-
plicitly correlate local detector alerts.
Clustering algorithms are well-known to be highly
sensitive to noise, especially in the high-dimensional
regime [31, 42, 73]. Indeed, classical approaches that
attempt to detect or to score ”outlyingness” of points
(e.g. Stahel-Donoho outlyingness, Mahalanobis dis-
tance, minimum volume ellipsoid, minimum covariance
determinant, etc) are fundamentally flawed in the high-
dimensional regime (i.e., theoretically cannot guarantee
correct detection with high probability). In Appendix A,
we demonstrate how a clustering global detector is inef-
fective in detecting a waterhole infection – i.e., cluster-
ing yields an Area Under Curve (AUC) metric of only ∼
48% in the waterhole attack.
Count-based global detectors (Count-GD), on the
other hand, suffer because they need to know the size of
local detector communities extremely accurately to de-
termine whether a significant fraction is raising alerts.
Fundamentally, even small errors in estimating the num-
ber of feature vectors in the community linearly affects
the global detector’s decision thresholds.
Proposed Ideas – Neighborhood filtering and Shape.
Our intuition is that weak local detectors can be aggre-
gated robustly by using information about how the mal-
ware spreads. Our proposed system (Figure 1), Shape-
GD, relies on two key insights to correctly identify mali-
cious feature vectors.
First, while attacks can take many forms, attack vec-
tors are easier to identify. For example, many attacks on
Symantec’s client machines rely on ‘downloader trojans’
to bring successive stages of payloads – hence, down-
loader graphs [49] on a machine are correlated with mal-
ware propagation. Similarly, in a firewalled enterprise,
machines that visit a specific server (in watering hole at-
tacks) are more likely to be compromised than a random
machine in the enterprise. Our key assumption is that
machines that have been exposed to a common attack
vector have correlated alerts – we call such a set of ma-
chines a neighborhood. Grouping local detectors into
neighborhoods (as they form dynamically) concentrates
the signal of malware activity that is otherwise not visi-
ble at the overall community level. However, neighbor-
hoods are extremely noisy due to exploit-types, machine
status, and human usage and render cluster and count-
based GDs ineffective – hence we propose Shape-GD to
aggregate local detectors’ outputs.
The second insight behind Shape-GD is that the dis-
tributional shape of a set of suspicious feature vectors
can robustly separate true positive neighborhoods from
false positive neighborhoods. Shape-GD analyzes only
those feature vectors that cause alerts by the local de-
tectors (alert-FVs) instead of analyzing all feature vec-
tors. Alert-FVs thus represent draws from one of two
conditional distributions – i.e., distribution of malicious
or benign feature vectors conditioned on being labeled
as malicious – which are similar but not the same. Next,
while a single suspicious feature vector is uninformative,
a set of such feature vectors (i.e., alert-FVs from a neigh-
borhood) can indeed be tested to come from one of two
similar-but-distinct distributions.
Case Studies. We consider two distinct case studies
where Shape-GD is applied in noisy communities of
weak behavioral detectors – one with long-term log en-
tries from a commercial detector, and the other a real-
time attack simulated using enterprise traces.
Our first setting comprises of 5 million client machines
monitored by malware detectors (here, Symantec [18]).
A local detector algorithm [53] that analyzes file at-
tributes using VirusTotal, when applied to this Syman-
tec Wine dataset [18], achieves a false positive rate of
5% – with 5 million local detectors in place, this requires
deeper human or program analysis of up to ∼1.1M files
to detect close to 137K malware files. A recent local de-
tector improves false positive rates down to 1% by train-
ing on metadata, such as features extracted from ‘down-
loader graphs’ [49, 50], but this increases false negatives
since it only detects malicious downloaders (that install
malware on devices) which comprise only∼32.7% of the
overall malware in the community.
Our second setting is an enterprise whose devices are
infected through a compromised server (waterhole at-
tack), where each device also runs a local system-call
based malware detector [23] and sends reports to a global
detector. We reimplemented system call based local de-
tectors to achieve representative detection rates [23] –
where a true positive rate of 92.4% yields a false posi-
tive rate of 6%.
We show that in the Symantec Wine case study Shape-
2
GD detects malicious neighborhoods early – with more
than 5% of malicious files – at a false positive and true
positive rate of 5.8% and 84% respectively. And it
achieves 0.54% false positive rate and 78% true positive
file-level detection results. In the waterhole case study
it detects malicious neighborhoods with less than 1.1%
compromised nodes per neighborhood at a false positive
and true positive rate of 1% and 100% respectively.
Neighborhood filtering and shape property comple-
ment each other – neighborhoods concentrate the weak
signal into a small but unpredictable set of feature vec-
tors while shape extracts this signal without knowing the
precise number of feature vectors. In contrast, our exper-
iments show that when applied to noisy neighborhoods,
Count-GD’s detection performance only matches Shape-
GD’s detection performance if it can estimate neigh-
borhood size to within -30% to +1% for the Symantec
case study and -0.1% to +13.8% in the waterhole attack
– this makes CountGD extremely fragile in real-world
distributed systems. To summarize, Shape-GD enables
practitioners’ insights about attack vectors to be captured
algorithmically and at scale.
2 Overview of Shape-GD
Threat model and Deployment. We assume a stan-
dard threat model where trusted local detectors (LDs) at
each machine communicate with a trusted global detec-
tor (GD) that receives alerts and other metadata from the
local detectors. The LDs are isolated from untrusted ap-
plications on local machines using OS- (e.g., SELinux)
and hardware mechanisms (e.g., ARM TrustZone), and
communicate with the enterprise’s GD through an au-
thenticated channel.
Shape-GD fits deployment models that are common
today. Currently, enterprises use SIEM tools (like HP
Arcsight and Splunk) to monitor network traffic and sys-
tem/application logs, malware analysis sandboxes that
scan emails for malicious links and attachments, in addi-
tion to host-based malware detectors (LDs) from Syman-
tec, McAfee, Lookout, etc. We use exactly these side-
information – from network logs (client-IP, server IP,
timestamp) and email monitoring tools – to instantiate
neighborhoods and filter LDs’ alert-FVs based on neigh-
borhoods (Algorithms 1, 2). Upon receiving alert-FVs,
Shape-GD runs its malware detection algorithm (Algo-
rithm 3) for all neighborhoods the alert-FVs belong to. If
a particular neighborhood is suspicious, then Shape-GD
will notify a downstream analysis (deeper static/dynamic
analyses or human analysts) and forward relevant infor-
mation in the incident report.
Inferring neighborhoods from common attack vec-
tors. Shape-GD operates over dynamic neighborhoods,
which are updated once per neighborhood time window
(NTW). Neighborhoods within large communities are a
set of nodes that share a statically defined action attribute
within the current time window – this allows an analyst
to create neighborhoods of nodes based on common at-
tack vectors. Below are some illustrative examples of
communities and neighborhoods.
1. Malware propagation across Symantec clients.
The community here consists of all Symantec clients.
Though attackers, when distributing malware through
compromised websites, may not have an intention to tar-
get Symantec clients’ machines, they get infected due to
high number of subscribers to Symantec malware de-
tection service. In the Symantec dataset, both benign
and malicious files launch a chain of downloads. Thus,
a neighborhood can comprise a set of files transitively
downloaded from a suspicious domain (Section 4.2). As
domains get periodically cleared out, and their classifi-
cation is not necessarily very robust, neighborhoods only
indicate a probability that files within them may be ma-
licious.
2. Waterhole attack. The community here consists of the
employees of an enterprise such as Anthem Health [13,
14]. In a waterhole attack, adversaries compromise a
website commonly visited by such employees as a way
to infiltrate the enterprise network and then spread within
the network to a privileged machine or user. Within
this community, a neighborhood can be the set of nodes
that visited the same type of websites within the cur-
rent neighborhood time window (for example, some per-
centile of suspicious links rated by VirusTotal [15] or
SecureRank [12]). Since these rankings themselves are
fuzzy, and the websites and their contents are dynamic,
neighborhoods only indicate a probability that the node
was actually exposed to an exploit.
Intuition behind shape property. The statistical shape
of local detectors’ false positives (FP conditional distri-
bution) differs from the corresponding shape for true pos-
itives (TP conditional distribution) – we use this property
to aggregate LDs’ alert-FVs to find the shape of each
neighborhood and then classify neighborhoods based on
their shapes.
The central question then is – why do true- and false-
positive FVs’ shapes differ? To explain this and set the
stage for Shape-GD, we consider a stylized statistical
inference example. Suppose that we have an unknown
number of nodes within a neighborhood. We want to
distinguish between two extremes – all nodes only run
benign applications (benign hypothesis), or all nodes run
malware (malware hypothesis). We look at a single snap-
shot of time where each node generates exactly one fea-
ture vector. Under the benign hypothesis, assume that the
feature vector from each node is a (scalar valued) sample
from a standard Gaussian with mean of ‘-1’; alternatively
it is standard Gaussian with mean of ‘+1’ under the mal-
ware hypothesis (Figure 2) (leftmost plot). The optimal
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Figure 2: (Shape of conditional distributions) (L to R) Probability density function (pdf) of benign/malicious feature
vectors (FVs) in a stylized example, which are drawn from the Gaussian with mean ‘-1/+1’. PDFs of the same
Gaussians, but now conditioned on a local detector raising an alert – PDFs of true/false positive FVs have different
shapes. Real-world PDFs of true/false positive multi-dimensional FVs projected on the first two principal components
in Symantec Wine and waterhole case studies respectively.
local detector at any machine would declare ’malware’
if a sample’s value is positive, and otherwise – ’benign-
ware’.
Even though individual false and true positives are in-
distinguishable at the local detector level, we can dif-
ferentiate between them by approximating distributions
they come from. To do this we need to aggregate alerts at
the neighborhood level. These values represent indepen-
dent draws from a conditional distribution – either the
distribution of a normal random variable of mean ’−1’
conditioned on taking a nonnegative value, or the distri-
bution of a normal random variable of mean ’+1’ condi-
tioned on taking a nonnegative value. This conditioning
occurs because of the local detector tags a sample as an
alert if and only if the sample drawn was non-negative.
Thus, irrespective of the size of the neighborhood, the
global detector would “look at the shape” of the empir-
ical distribution of the received FVs. If it is “closer” to
the distribution of false positives rather than the distribu-
tion of true positives (Figure 2) (second from the left), it
would declare a neighborhood to be “benign”, otherwise
– “malicious”.
Shape in real datasets. Though in the stylized one-
dimensional example it is straightforward to distinguish
between benign and malicious neighborhoods, real-
world multidimensional distributions in Symantec Wine
and waterhole case studies do not allow such simple in-
terpretation (Figure 2) (two plots on the right). Figure 2
(two plots on the right) shows conditional distributions
of false and true positives projected on the first two prin-
cipal components in Symantec Wine and waterhole case
studies respectively. We show that the intuition behind
this simple example scales to real malware detectors that
use high-dimensional feature vectors. However, to use
this insight in practice, we need to address two issues:
(i) while corresponding conditional distributions are vi-
sually distinct, an algorithmic approach requires a quan-
titative score function to separate between the (vector-
valued) conditional distributions generated from feature
vector samples; and (ii) the global detector receives only
finitely many samples; thus, we can construct (at best)
only a noisy estimate of the conditional distribution. We
describe Shape-GD’s details in Section 4.
3 Related Work
3.1 Behavioral analysis
Behavioral analysis refers to statistical methods that
monitor signals from program execution, extract features
and build models from these signals, and then use these
models to classify processes as malicious. Importantly,
as we discuss in this section, all known behavioral de-
tectors have a high false positive and negative rate (es-
pecially when zero-day and mimicry attacks are factored
in).
System-calls and middleware API calls have been
studied extensively as a signal for behavioral detec-
tors [34, 70, 19, 26, 36, 23, 59]. Network intrusion
detection systems [58] analyze network traffic to de-
tect known malicious or anomalous behaviors. More re-
cently, behavioral detectors use signals such as power
consumption[28], CPU utilization, memory footprint,
and hardware performance counters[30, 66].
Detectors then extract features from these raw sig-
nals. For example, an n-gram is a contiguous sequence
of n items that captures total order relations [38, 23], n-
tuples are ordered events that do not require contiguity,
and bags are simply histograms. These can be combined
to create bags of tuples, tuples of bags, and tuples of n-
grams [23, 34] often using principal component analysis
to reduce dimensions. Further, system calls with their ar-
guments form a dependency graph structure that can be
compared to sub-graphs that represent malicious behav-
iors [26, 47, 19].
Finally, detectors train models to classify executions
into malware/benignware using supervised (signature-
based) or unsupervised (anomaly-based) learning. These
models range from distance metrics, histogram compar-
ison, hidden markov models (HMM), and neural net-
works (artificial neural networks, fuzzy neural networks,
etc.), to more common classifiers such as kNN, one-class
SVMs, decision trees, and ensembles thereof.
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Such machine learning models, however, result in
high false positives and negatives. Anomaly detectors
can be circumvented by mimicry attacks where mal-
ware mimics system-calls of benign applications [70] or
hides within the diversity of benign network traffic[64].
Sommer et al. [64] additionally highlights several prob-
lems that can arise due to overfitting a model to a
non-representative training set, suggesting signature-
based detectors as the primary choice for real deploy-
ments. Unfortunately, signature-based detectors cannot
detect new (zero-day) attacks. On Android, both sys-
tem calls [22] and hardware-counter based detectors [30]
yield ∼20% false positives and ∼80% true positives.
Finally, with their ability to extract highly effective
features, deep nets may provide a new way forward for
creating novel behavioral detectors. At the global level,
however, what is needed is a data-light approach for
global detection by composing local detectors, tailored to
be agile enough to do global detection in a fast-changing
(non-stationary) environment.
3.2 Collaborative Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (CIDS)
Collaborative intrusion detection systems (CIDS) pro-
vide an architecture where LDs’ alerts are aggregated by
a global detector (GD). GDs can use either signature-
based or anomaly-based[76, 68], or even a combination
of the two [48] to generate global alerts. Additionally,
the CIDS architecture can be centralized, hierarchical, or
distributed (using a peer-to-peer overlay network) [76].
In all cases, existing GDs use some variant of either
clustering or count-based algorithms to aggregate LDs’
alerts. Count-based GD raises an alert once the number
of alerts exceeds a threshold within a space-time window,
while clustering-based GD may apply some heuristics to
control the number of alerts [29, 72, 38, 37, 60]. In
HIDE [76], the global detector at each hierarchical-tier is
a neural network trained on network traffic information.
Worminator[51] additionally uses bloom filters to com-
pact LDs’ outputs and schedules LDs to form groups in
order to spread alert information quickly through a dis-
tributed system. All count- and clustering-based algo-
rithms are fragile when the noise is high (in the early
stages of an infection) and when the network size is
uncertain. In contrast, our neighborhood filtering and
shape-based GD is robust against such uncertainty.
Note that distributed CIDSs are vulnerable to probe-
response attacks, where the attacker probes the network
to find the location and defensive capabilities of an
LD [62, 21, 61]. These attacks are orthogonal to our set-
ting since we do not have fixed LDs (i.e. all nodes are
LDs).
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Figure 3: Application of Shape-GD to malware detection
in Symantec Wine and waterhole case studies.
4 Shape-GD Algorithm
The algorithm consists of feature extraction, local de-
tectors (LDs), and the global detector (GD). Figure 3
shows how to apply Shape-GD to malware detection in
Symantec Wine and waterhole case studies. Our key
innovations are in the GD. LDs’ design is inspired by
prior work, therefore we discuss it in details in the Ap-
pendix B and briefly summarize LDs detection perfor-
mance in Sections 6, 7.
4.1 Shape-GD Classifiers
Shape-GD utilizes two types of local detectors that
analyze executable files and a domain name classifier
that analyzes domain metadata. To perform file analysis,
we adapt local detectors from prior work. The Syman-
tec Wine data set lacks executable files (it includes only
their hashes), therefore we use VirusTotal [15] file anal-
ysis reports. Our detector combines feature extraction
described in a prior work [53] and a standard machine
learning classifier – XGBoost [24]. In the waterhole
case study, we develop a detector that extracts feature
vectors from dynamic sequences of executed system call
traces and uses Random Forest algorithm for classifica-
tion. Overall, it achieves performance comparable to the
best classifier from a prior survey [23].
To use Shape-GD a human analyst needs to supply a
description of neighborhood attributes. They can be as
simple as a list of high valued servers (waterhole case
study) or they can be derived using a machine learning
algorithm. In the Symantec Wine case study we use a
domain name classifier, which consumes VirusTotal do-
main reports as input, to detect suspicious domains that
are used to form neighborhoods.
4.2 Neighborhood Instances from Attack-
Templates
Within each neighborhood time window (NTW),
Shape-GD generates neighborhood instances based on
statically defined attack vectors – each attack vector is a
“Template” to generate neighborhoods with. The goal of
5
partitioning data into neighborhoods is to create predom-
inantly benign or malicious neighborhoods. The algo-
rithm runs once per neighborhood time window (NTW).
Hence the partitioning algorithm is radically different
across the case studies.
Symantec Wine. The Algorithm 1 partitions down-
loaded files into multiple neighborhoods. It uses the fol-
lowing intuition: if a domain is malicious, then the files
transitively downloaded from such a domain are likely to
be malicious.
For ease of explanation, we treat the previously intro-
duced domain name classifier as a predicate (line 1). At
each iteration the algorithm starts with identifying a set
of suspicious domains within the current NTW (lines 4–
5), which is done using the domain name classifier. Then
the algorithm uses each suspicious domain as a seed to
initiate the neighborhood formation process (lines 6 –
12). Next, for each suspicious domain it searches for
the files within the current NTW that access that partic-
ular domain (either download other files from it or being
downloaded from it) – the set F (line 7). By following
downloader graph edges the algorithm selects files tran-
sitively downloaded by the files in the set F (line 10) and
filters out those that do not access any of the suspicious
domains (line 11). The files that have not been excluded
are added to the current neighborhood (line 12).
Note that the algorithm formation process may gen-
erate many small neighborhoods. An estimate of the
conditional distribution using such feature vectors (Sec-
tion 4.3) is usually susceptible to high variance, thus
neighborhoods containing an insufficient number of files
may have negative impact on the accuracy of the neigh-
borhood classifier (Section 4.3). To reduce variance and
achieve robust classification of neighborhoods, the al-
gorithm merges them such that final neighborhoods are
greater than some predefined minimum size. Empirical
analysis of the accuracy of the neighborhood classifier
shows that it achieves robust classification of neighbor-
hoods containing more than 1000 files.
In order to maintain neighborhood effect after merg-
ing, i.e. to have mostly homogeneous neighborhoods –
either benign or malicious, the merging algorithm ranks
neighborhoods in terms of maliciousness, where mali-
cious score is defined as the relative number of LDs’
alerts within a neighborhood. After that the algorithm
sorts neighborhoods based on their malicious score and
proceeds merging them in a decreasing order of their ma-
licious scores. Note that malicious score estimation may
be incorrect if we incorrectly estimate the neighborhood
size, but Shape-GD tolerates such errors.
Waterhole. The algorithm (Algorithm 2) to form a
neighborhood to detect a waterhole attack significantly
differs from the one used in the Symantec Wine exper-
iment. It creates a neighborhood from client machines
Algorithm 1: Symantec Wine: Neighborhoods from
Attack-Vectors
Input : Downloader graphs
Output: Neighborhoods
Domain name classifier
1 Let DNC (domain): domain is malicious
execute once per NTW
2 while True do
create an empty list of neighborhoods
3 nbds← /0
identify active domains within the current NTW
4 D← domains accessed within the current NTW
identify suspicious domains
5 D′ ← {d ∈ D | DNC(d)}
6 foreach suspicious domain di ∈ D′ do
identify files accessing the domain di
7 F ← files accessing the domain di
initialize an empty neighborhood
8 nbd ← /0
9 foreach file fi ∈ F do
search for transitively downloaded files
10 Fi ← files transitively downloaded by fi
retain suspicious files
11 F ′i ← { f ile ∈ Fi |
∃d ∈ f ile.domains DNC(d)}
12 nbd← N ⋃ F ′i
13 nbds← nbds ⋃ nbd
that access a server or a group of servers within a neigh-
borhood time window.
To abstract away from technical details, we define the
predicate (line 1) which is true if a client A accesses a
server B. Each iteration starts with defining the set V of
client machines that are active within the current NTW
and the set S of servers that those clients access within
the NTW (line 4 – 5). Then the algorithm proceeds with
partitioning the set S into one or more disjoint subsets Pi
(line 6). This is to incorporate ‘structural filtering’ into
the algorithm, allowing an analyst to create neighbor-
hoods based on subsets of servers (instead of all servers
in case of waterhole). Structural filtering boosts detec-
tion under certain conditions (Appendix G). The neigh-
borhood instantiation algorithm builds a neighborhood
for each partition Pi (line 8) and, finally, it adds the just
formed neighborhoods to nbds list (line 9).
4.3 Shape Property for Malware Detection
After identifying neighborhoods, the next step is to
detect neighborhoods with high malware concentration.
In order to accomplish this, we introduce a novel ap-
proach to extracting neighborhood features that formal-
izes shape property.
The key algorithmic idea is to map all alert-FVs within
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Algorithm 2: Neighborhoods from Attack-Vectors
Input : Network flow data
Output: Neighborhoods
1 Let predicate(A:Client, B:Servers) := A accesses B
execute once per NTW
2 while True do
create an empty list of neighborhoods
3 nbds← /0
4 V := client machines*
5 S := accessed servers*
partitioning a set into non-disjoint sets to incorporate
structural filtering
6 P1,P2, ...,PN ← partition-set(S), where S =
N⋃
i=1
Pi
7 foreach partition Pi do
form neighborhoods nbdi using partitions Pi
8 nbd ← {V | predicate(V , Pi)}
9 nbds← nbds ⋃ nbd
*active within the time window NTW
a neighborhood to a single vector-histogram which ro-
bustly captures the neighborhood’s statistical properties.
Such transformation allows us to analyze the joint prop-
erties of all alert-FVs generated within a neighborhood
without requiring FVs to be clustered or alerts to be
counted. After that, Shape-GD feeds neighborhood-level
feature vectors into a binary classifier to identify mali-
cious neighborhoods. We use two types of binary classi-
fiers: boosted decision trees in the Symantec Wine case
study and a Wasserstein distance-based threshold test in
the waterhole experiment.
Generating a vector-histogram from alert-FVs. The
algorithm aggregates L-dimensional projections of alert-
FVs on per neighborhood basis into a set B (Algorithm
3, line 3). After that, Shape-GD converts low dimen-
sional representation of alert-FVs, the set B, into a single
(L,b)-dimensional vector-histogram denoted by HB (line
4). The conversion is performed by binning and normal-
izing L-dimensional vectors within the set B along each
dimension. Effectively, a vector-histogram is a matrix
Lxb, where L is the dimensionality of alert-FVs and b is
the number of bins per dimension. Further implementa-
tion details can be found in the Appendix C.
We use standard methods to determine the size and
number of bins. In particular, we tried square-root
choice, Rice rule, and Doane’s formula [5] to estimate
the number of bins, and we found that 20–100 bins
yielded best results.
Neighborhood classifier. Shape-GD may use any bi-
nary classifier (Algorithm 3, line 4) as a neighbor-
hood classifier. We use the following two classi-
fiers – boosted decision trees (XGBoost [24]) and a
specially designed Wasserstein distance-based distance
Algorithm 3: Neighborhood Classification
Input : Suspicious neighborhoods nbds
Output: Malicious neighborhoods
1 for each nbd in nbds do
aggregate L-dim projections of alert-FVs on per
neighborhood basis
2 B← {alert−FV s | alert−FV ⊂ nbd}
build an (L,b)-dim. vector-histogram
3 HB← bin & normalize B along each dimension
classify the neighborhood
4 if Neighborhood Classifier(nbd) then
5 label nbd as malicious
(’ShapeScore’) (Appendix D) in the Symantec Wine and
waterhole case studies respectively. The main advantage
of using XGBoost is its ability to learn complex deci-
sion boundary and it can be trained in a non-parametric
mode (we completely automated parameter search pro-
cess). However, in comparison to ShapeScore, XGBoost
algorithm requires both benign and malicious data for
training purposes. Thus, the threshold test can be trained
using only benign data and it acts as an anomaly detec-
tor. In our experiments, we found that XGBoost out-
performs the ShapeScore function in the Symantec Wine
case study, while the ShapeScore yields good detection
accuracy in the waterhole case study.
Note like any other machine learning classifier, the bi-
nary classifier employed by Shape-GD needs to be re-
trained periodically to account for constantly evolving
statistical software properties.
5 Experimental Setup
We evaluate Shape-GD using two publicly available
datasets. First, in the Symantec Wine dataset [18],
Shape-GD uses malware reports from Symantec client
devices and reduces the LDs’ false positives from ∼1M
down to ∼110K, while retaining 107K out of 137K mal-
ware files. Second, we simulate a waterhole attack us-
ing Yahoo’s web-service network logs [6] overlayed with
host-level malware and benighware traces [46]. In this
testbed, Shape-GD detects an attack within a few sec-
onds and with only about 100 compromised machines
out of over 550,000 potential compromises). In both set-
tings, Shape-GD successfully amplifies the weak signal
inherent to malware propagation.
5.1 Wine dataset
Wine dataset [32, 49, 50] contains telemetry informa-
tion collected by Symantec’s intrusion prevention sys-
tem and Symantec antivirus product over 5 year period
– from 2008 until 2013. The dataset summarizes file
downloader activities across 5M Windows hosts around
the world. File downloads are represented in the form of
downloader graphs (the abstraction introduced by Kwon
7
chrome.exe
globaldl.net
antivirus.exe
dtsusuk.org
pathjq.org
icomment.com
mb3admin.com
idimager.com
kaytri.com
gravic.com
A
B
C
G
E
D
F
H
I
webguard.exe
kmplayer.exe
firefox.exe
skype.exe
rexpert.exe
setupnew.exe
Benign file Malicious file
Benign domain Malicious domain
Figure 4: Example of a downloader graph.
et al. [49]) – one per end host. A graph node represents a
downloaded file (SHA256 file hash) and a directed edge
between two nodes na and nb indicates that the file na
has downloaded the file nb from a domain D on the cor-
responding host machine, where D is the edge’s label.
Figure 4 depicts an example of a downloader graph.
Each node is labeled with a corresponding file name,
and each edge bears a domain name from where a file
has been downloaded. We also overlay ground truth on
the nodes and edges: red color means that a file or a
domain is malicious, while the blue color means that a
file/domain is benign.
We used the VirusTotal (VT) service to obtain ground-
truth information about the 20.3M file-hashes down-
loaded 67M times and all 353K domain names in Wine
(Table 7). Though file-level VirusTotal reports contain
results of signature-based malware detection, we do not
use them for within Shape-GD (except for computing
the ground truth). Hence, information within VirusTo-
tal domain reports might be affected by post-analysis
performed by commercial antivirus vendors. However,
there are alternative approaches to establish domain rep-
utation [40] that outperform our domain name classifier
by using a different set of domain features, which are
unavailable in the Symantec Wine dataset.
For files (corresponding to a file-hash) or domain
names that VT has information for, it used 62 different
anti-viruses and other heuristics to generate a report –
this report is used to train the file-behavior and domain-
name classifiers. We consider a file to be malicious if
more than 30% of antivirus products label it as mal-
ware [49]. This yields 2.6M reports for file-hashes, with
137K confirmed to be malicious, and 301K reports for
domain names. We label all remaining files and domain
names (i.e., that are not confirmed to be either malware or
benign by VT) as benign – this is a conservative step that
weakens the malware propagation signal in the dataset
and is also representative of real deployments where in-
formation about suspicious files/domain-names is often
delayed or unavailable.
5.2 Modeling Waterhole Attacks
Waterhole attack. To model a waterhole attack, we use
Yahoo’s “G4: Network Flows Data” [6] dataset, which
contains communication data between end-users and Ya-
hoo servers. The 41.4 GB (in compressed form) of
data were collected on April 29-30, 2008. Each netflow
record includes a timestamp, source/destination IP ad-
dress, source/destination port, protocol, number of pack-
ets and the number of bytes transferred from the source
to the destination 1.
Specifically, we use 5 hours of network traffic (208
million records) captured on April 29, 2008 between 8
am and 1 pm at the border routers connecting Dallas Ya-
hoo data center (DAX) to the large Internet. The selected
50 DAX servers communicate with 3,181,127 client ma-
chines over 14,249,931 requests.
We assume that an attacker compromises one of the
most frequently accessed DAX server – 118.242.107.76,
which processes ∼ 752,000 requests within 5-hour time
window (∼ 43.7 requests per second). In our simula-
tion it gets compromised at random instant between 8am
and 10.30am. Hence, Shape GD can use the remaining
2.5 hours to detect the attack (our results show that less
than a hundred seconds suffice). Following infection, we
simulate this ‘waterhole’ server compromising client ma-
chines over time with an infection probability parameter
– this helps us determine the time to detection at differ-
ent rates of infection. The benign and compromised ma-
chines then select corresponding type of execution trace
(i.e., a sequence of FVs generated below) and input these
to their LDs.
Benign and malware applications. We collect data
from thousands of benign applications and malware sam-
ples. To avoid tracing program executions where mal-
ware may not have executed any stage of its exploit or
payload correctly, we set a threshold of 100 system calls
per execution to be considered a success. Our experi-
ments successfully run 1,311 malware samples from 193
malware families collected in July 2013 [46], and 2,364
more recent samples from 13 popular malware families
collected in 2015 [10], to compare against traces from
1,889 benign applications.
We record time stamped sequences of executed sys-
tem calls using Intel’s Pin dynamic binary instrumenta-
tion tool. Each Amazon AWS virtual machine instance
runs Windows Server 2008 R2 Base on the default T2
micro instances with 1GB RAM, 1 vCPU, and 50GB lo-
cal storage. The VMs are populated with user data com-
monly found on a real host including PDFs, Word docu-
1All IP addresses in the dataset are anonymized using a random
permutation algorithm, thus it is impossible to trace them back to the
real servers
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ments, photos, Firefox browser history, Thunderbird cal-
endar entries and contacts, and social network creden-
tials. To avoid interference between malware samples,
we execute each sample in a fresh install of the reference
VM. As malware may try to propagate over the local net-
work, we set up a sub-net of VMs accessible from the
VM that runs the malware sample. In this sub-net, we
left open common ports (HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, DNS,
Telnet, and IRC) used by malware to execute its payload.
We run each benign and malware program 10 times for
5 minutes per run for a total of almost 53,000 hours total
compute time on Amazon AWS.
Overall, benignware and malware were active for
141,670 sec and 283,270 seconds respectively, execut-
ing an average of 11,900 and 13,500 system calls per
second respectively. Using 1 second time window (Sec-
tion 4) and sliding the time windows by 1ms, we extract
histograms of system calls within each time window as
the ML feature, and finally pick 1.5M benign and 1M
malicious FVs from this dataset for the experiments that
follow. Importantly, we do not constrain the samples on
neighboring machines to belong to the same families – as
described above, malware today predominantly spreads
through malware distribution networks where a down-
loader trojan (‘dropper’) can distribute arbitrary and un-
related payloads on hosts. We want to test Shape-GD in
the extreme case where malicious FVs can be assigned
from any malware execution to any machine.
6 Case Study 1: Symantec Wine Dataset
We now quantify how Shape-GD concentrates mal-
ware in Symantec’s Wine dataset into neighborhoods.
By using downloader graphs as a weakly correlated at-
tribute, Shape-GD identifies malicious files and infected
machines with significantly lower false positives than us-
ing LDs [53] alone and far higher true-positives than a
downloader-graph based detector [49, 50] alone.
In addition, neighborhoods and shape together are
good predictors of malware behavior – hence Shape-GD
does not have to wait until the entire sequence of mal-
ware payloads have been downloaded to declare a down-
loader or a machine as malicious. We find that on aver-
age, Shape-GD can identify a file as malicious only ∼20
days after it enters the Wine dataset and ∼345 days be-
fore VirusTotal confirms it as malware. Table 7 summa-
rizes these results.
6.1 Shape-GD Classifiers
Local detectors. We start with the evaluation of local de-
tectors (Section 4.1). Each local detector algorithm com-
prises two parts – feature extraction and a binary classi-
fier (XGBoost in our prototype). We train a local detector
on the set of 2.6 million VirusTotal reports using 10-fold
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Figure 5: (Left) Receiver operating curve (ROC) of the
local detector and the domain name classifier. (Right)
ROC of the neighborhood classifier.
cross validation. The detector achieves 97.61% area-
under-the-curve metric (Figure 6.1), and we chose the
operating point of 5.0% false positive rate and 90.47%
true positive rate. Note that due to the high number of
benign files in the dataset, a 5.0% false positive rate cor-
responds to more than 1M misclassified files, which is
likely to prevent practical deployment of such a local
detector. In subsequent experiments, we use out-of-fold
predictions made by the detector.
Domain name classifier. We train and evaluate the clas-
sifier (Section 4.1) on 251K VirusTotal domain reports
using 10-fold cross validation to achieve an 91.58% AUC
(Figure 5). We specifically choose an operating point of
19.03% false positives and 95.41% true positives.
The domain name classifier is ‘weak’ because it is
conservative while labeling domains – an entire domain
is considered malicious if it serves at least one malware
sample. However, even malicious domains serve sev-
eral benign files, and the local detector (above) that ana-
lyzes file-level features using VirusTotal contradicts the
domain name classifier. Adding more information about
the URL can improve the classifier – however, even the
weak signal in domain names is sufficient for Shape-GD
to significantly improve the local detectors. Interestingly,
since the domain name classifier is only used to create
neighborhoods (and not alerts), it can operate at a conser-
vative setting and rely on the shape-based neighborhood
classifier to weed out false positives.
The domain name classifier lets Shape-GD efficiently
filter out domains that are unlikely to distribute mali-
cious files. Specifically, it removes from further consid-
eration 68.62% (214,884 out of 313,133) completely be-
nign domains that are responsible for delivering 80.70%
(16,222,941 out of 20,103,211) benign files. At the same
time the classifier retains 75.86% (30,448 out of 40,134)
malicious domains responsible for delivering 88.31%
(94,457 out of 106,959) malicious files.
Neighborhood classifier. The neighborhood classifier
(Algorithm 3) performs neighborhood-level feature ex-
traction and feeds resulting feature vectors into an XG-
Boost classifier. We estimate its detection capabilities us-
ing 10-fold cross validation. The ROC plot (Figure 6.1)
shows that the classifier achieves 96.13% AUC score,
and we choose the following operating point: 5% false
positives and 91.83% true positive rate.
A neighborhood-level alert is different from an the
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Figure 6: Neighborhood classifier acts as a malware
concentrator. (Top) Distribution of infection rates of ran-
domly grouped files. (Middle) Distribution of neighbor-
hoods’ infection rates. (Bottom) Distribution of neigh-
borhoods’ infection rates after filtering out low-infected
neighborhoods. The neighborhood classifier retains
only highly infected neighborhoods. (Distributions are
capped at 1,000 level.)
above file- and domain-name based local detectors’ alerts
– it signifies that a set of files that have suspicious be-
havior have been downloaded from suspicious links, and
hence identifies the large majority of files that were false
positives at the local level. First, we measure the de-
gree to which our neighborhood classifier removes be-
nign files, and then show that by re-examining files in
suspicious neighborhoods (using the file-based LD), we
can capture 78.03% of true positives.
6.2 Neighborhoods Concentrate Malware
First, we measure the effect of using domain names
from downloader graphs as an attribute to create neigh-
borhoods.
The original malware concentration in the Wine
dataset is only 0.663%, as shown in the top-most plot
of Figure 6. If a random subset of files are grouped
into a neighborhood, each neighborhood will have con-
siderably less malware than the false positive rate of the
malware detectors (5%) – i.e., creating neighborhoods
randomly does not concentrate malicious activity. This
is the baseline against which downloader graph based
neighborhood creation and shape-based neighborhood
classifier have to be compared – the neighborhoods la-
beled as malicious have to contain more than 5% mali-
cious files while achieving high malware coverage over-
all.
Shape-GD first uses the domain-name classifier to
prune out files downloaded from benign domains – this
increases the 0.663% infection rate to 9.49% (middle
plot, Figure 6). However, high bars on the left-hand side
(they are cut off at 1,000 file level) indicate a large major-
ity of neighborhoods have relatively low concentration of
malicious files in them.
Shape-GD then uses the shape-based neighborhood
classifier to identify infected neighborhoods. This dra-
matically changes the distribution of neighborhood in-
Parameter
Prior Work 
[CCS’15]
Local Detectors 
[DIMVA’16]
Neighborhood
Detector
Shape Detector
# of benign files 20,407,667
# of malicious files 137,279
Possible early detection, files 68,398
False positives
4,390 1,022,439 1,184,234 109,951
0.021% 5.01% 5.80% 0.54%
True positives (Recall)
43,091 124,190 115,357 107,124
31.39% 90.47% 84.03% 78.03%
Precision 73.5% 10.83% 8.88% 49.35%
F-1 score 46.64% 19.35% 16.06% 60.46%
Early detection, days 9.24 214.08 340.42 345.33
Time to detection, days N/A 0 20.46 20.33
Early detection, files
3,002 62,815 31,266 29,356
4.4% 92% 46% 43%
Figure 7: File-level aggregate results.
fection rates, i.e. the peak shifts to the right – from 1% to
5% (lowest plot in Figure 6). The neighborhood classifier
brings the average malware concentration in a neighbor-
hood from 9.49% to 24.6%, an increase of 37.1× com-
pared to randomly grouping files into neighborhoods.
Specifically, the number of neighborhoods with the in-
fection rate less than 1% drops by 437.6 times (from
8752 on the upper plot to 20 on the lower plot). Over-
all, the neighborhood classifier together with the domain-
name classifier reduce the number of low infected neigh-
borhoods (neighborhoods with less than 5% of malicious
files) by 36.4 times (from 21,792 to 599).
6.3 Aggregate Detection Results
We now quantify the detection performance of the
complete pipeline – i.e., by applying the malware clas-
sifier to files inside infected neighborhoods. By iden-
tifying malicious neighborhoods, Shape-GD effectively
weeds out many files that trigger false alerts – hence, the
alerts within infected neighborhoods are∼37 times more
likely to be malware (true postive).
To perform real-time analysis, we replay the 5-year
long history of download events in the Wine dataset
(each event has a timestamp associated with it) and exe-
cute Shape-GD every 30 days. We set the neighborhood
time window (NTW) parameter to 150 days because we
found that the average lifespan of malicious domains is
157 days. In our experiments we observed that shorter
period between consecutive runs of Shape-GD does not
significantly affect results, it only improves time to de-
tection and early detection parameters (Table 7). We in-
tentionally stick to a 30-day period between consecutive
runs of Shape-GD to keep execution time (∼12 hours)
and resource consumption manageable.
We compare Shape-GD that comprises of the neigh-
borhood classifier and local detectors with prior work –
local detectors [53] and the state-of-the-art malware de-
tector in the Wine dataset [49] – as well as a neighbor-
hood detector. For comparison we use standard machine
learning metrics: precision = T PT P+FP , recall =
T P
T P+FN ,
and F−1 = 2 · precision·recallprecision+recall .
Though Shape-GD is designed to act as a real-time
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malware detector, i.e. output detection results every time
it is executed, in this section we only focus on the file-
level aggregate results (Table 7) in order to compare with
a prior work. For completeness we describe machine-
level aggregate results in the Appendix F and the real-
time detection results in the Appendix E. The aggregate
results are computed by merging malware detection re-
sults across independent executions of a malware detec-
tor. Note that we count each file exactly once, for exam-
ple, if a malware detector detects the same malicious file
over multiple NTWs, we count it only once.
False positive rate. The downloader detector [49]
achieves the lowest FP rate. It raises 1.0% false positives
on the set of downloaders, however, downloaders con-
stitute only a small portion of the entire dataset (439K
out of 20.55M files). Thus, its effective FP rate comes
down to 0.021%, which is reached at the cost of exclud-
ing more than 20 million (or more than 97.3%) files from
the analysis. The other prior work – a local detector [53]
– has a fixed false positive rate of 5% that we set up in
our experiments to make it achieve above 90% TP rate.
Surprisingly, the neighborhood detector’s FP rate is
only marginally worse than the local detector’s FP rate
– 5.8% in comparison to 5%. However, it filters out sig-
nificant portion of benign files, which helps Shape-GD to
reduce FP rate by 10.7 (5.8% vs. 0.54%) times by using
the neighborhood detector as a file filter. In comparison
to the local detector, Shape-GD has 9.3 lower FP rate
(5% vs. 0.54%), thus it brings the absolute number of
false positives from ∼1.2 million down to ∼109.9 thou-
sand. Therefore, the deeper (even human-level) analysis
becomes feasible, i.e. ∼109.9 thousand false alerts over
a 5-year period correspond to 60 false alerts per day on
average.
True positive rate. The downloader detector [49] has
the lowest TP rate due to its inherent inability to analyze
non-downloaders. Therefore, it discovers 96% malicious
downloaders, but only 31.39% all malware samples –
it misses 94K out of 137K malware samples. Note the
Wine dataset may be skewed in the favor of malicious
downloaders, i.e. approximately one third of malware
samples in the dataset are malicious downloaders. Thus,
the downloader detector may have even lower TP rate in
a real deployment setting.
The neighborhood detector achieves a slightly lower
TP rate (∼84%) because it erroneously filters out some
malicious files while the local detectors analyze all of
them. Specifically, if the neighborhood detector fails to
correlate malicious downloads appropriately, it may dis-
tribute malware samples across multiple predominantly
benign neighborhoods. Due to low malware concentra-
tion they may be excluded from the further analysis by
the neighborhood classifier. The other reason why the
neighborhood classifier misses some malware may come
from labeling some malicious domains as benign. Thus,
malware samples downloaded from such domains are ex-
cluded from the further analysis.
In terms of true positives, Shape-GD inherits limi-
tations of the neighborhood detector. it loses a few
more percent due to running imperfect local detectors
within the neighborhoods that capture only 84% mal-
ware, which results in 78% TP rate. On the contrary,
local detectors demonstrate the highest TP rate (90.5%)
because they are tuned to achieve higher than 90% TP
rate.
F-1 score. All four detectors explore different operating
points in the FP/TP design space. To compare them, we
use a standard machine learning metric – F-1 score. The
F-1 score is bounded by 100%, which is achieved only if
a detector has 100% TP rate and 0% FP rate.
Shape-GD achieves the highest F-1 score (60.46%)
because it detects a large portion of malware samples
in the dataset (∼78%) and it maintains the low FP rate
(0.54%). The next closest competitor – the downloader
detector [49] – achieves only 46.64% F-1 score due to its
low TP rate. Interestingly, the local detector [53] demon-
strates ∼2.3 times worse results than the downloader de-
tector because of much high FP rate.
7 Case Study 2: Waterhole Attack
Shape-GD identifies malicious neighborhoods with
less than 1% false positive and 100% true positive rate
when the neighborhoods produce more than 15,000 FVs
within a neighborhood time window (i.e., |B| > 15,000
in Algorithm 3). Recall that at 60 FVs/node/minute, it
takes 1000 nodes only 15 seconds to create 15,000 FVs.
For LDs like ours with ∼6% false positive rate, this cor-
responds to 900 alert-FVs. We then simulate realistic
attack scenarios and find that Shape-GD can detect mal-
ware when only 108 of 550K possible nodes are infected
through a waterhole attack using a popular web-service.
7.1 Time to detection using temporal
neighborhoods
Temporal filtering creates a neighborhood using only
the nodes that are active within a neighborhood time win-
dow (NTW). For example, a temporal neighborhood for
the waterhole attack scenario would include all client de-
vices that accessed any server within the last NTW into
one neighborhood (∼ 17,000 nodes on average in 30 sec-
onds). This neighborhood filtering models a CIDS de-
signed to detect malware whose infection exhibits tem-
poral locality (and obviously does not detect attacks that
target a few high-value nodes through temporally uncor-
related vectors).
Interestingly, waterhole attacks exhibit ’bursty’ na-
ture: in our experiments, a popular waterhole server
quickly infects a large number of clients within a short
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Figure 8: (Waterhole attack: Time-based neighborhood
filtering) Dynamics of an attack: While the portion of
infected nodes in a neighborhood increases over time
reaching 1248 nodes on average, ShapeScore goes up
showing that Shape-GD becomes more confident in la-
beling neighborhoods as ‘malicious’. It starts detect-
ing malware with at most 1% false positive rate when
roughly 200 nodes get compromised. The neighborhood
includes 17,178 nodes on average and spans over 30 sec
time interval.
period of time – thus, we vary the waterhole NTW from
4 seconds up to 100 seconds.
Shape GD’s time to detection for one NTW. We fix
NTWs (30 seconds) and vary a parameter that represents
a node’s likelihood of infection from 0% up to 100% –
modeling whether a drive-by exploit succeeeds in a wa-
terhole attack.
Figure 8 plots the neighborhood score v. the average
number of infected nodes within benign (blue curve) and
malicious (red curve) neighborhoods – the two extreme
points on the X-axis corresponds to either none of the
machines being infected (the left side of a figure) or the
maximum possible number of machines being infected
(the right side of the figure). In this experiment, the wa-
terhole server can infect at most 1250 nodes in the 30
seconds NTW. Every point on a line is the median neigh-
borhood score from 100 experiments with whiskers set at
1%- and 99%- percentile scores. In each experiment we
use a random subset of training data for training purposes
and a random subset of testing data for testing.
When increasing the number of infected nodes in a
neighborhood, as expected, the red curve larger devi-
ates from the blue one. Therefore, Shape-GD becomes
more confident with labeling incoming partially infected
neighborhoods as malicious. Shape-GD starts reliably
detecting malware very quickly – when only 200 nodes
have been infected. We also experimented with other
sizes of neighborhood window – the plots we obtained
showed similar trends.
Shape GD’s sensitivity to NTW. We show that the size
of a neighborhood is important for early detection –
the minimum number of nodes that are infected before
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Figure 9: (Waterhole attack: Time-based neighborhood
filtering) Shape GD’s performance deteriorates linearly
when increasing the size of a neighborhood window from
6 sec to 100 sec.
Shape-GD raises an alert – in Figure 9. Varying the NTW
essentially competes the rates at which both malicious
and benign FVs accumulate.
We vary the NTW from from 4 sec to 100 sec and
record the number of infected nodes when Shape-GD can
make robust predictions (i.e. less than 1% FP for almost
100% TP). The results are averaged across 100 experi-
ments.
In a waterhole scenario, the number of client devices
active within a time window (and hence the false posi-
tive alert-FVs from the neighborhood) grows much faster
than the malware can spread (even if we assume that ev-
ery client that visits the waterhole server gets infected.
Here, a large NTW aggregates many more benign (false
positive) FVs from clients accessing non-compromised
servers. Hence, increasing the NTW degrades time to de-
tection. Shape-GD works best with an NTW of 6 seconds
– only 107.5 nodes on average become infected out of a
possible ∼550,000 nodes. Note that a very small NTW
(below 6 seconds) either does not accumulate enough
FVs for analysis – if so, Shape-GD outputs no results
– or creates large variance in the shape of benign neigh-
borhoods and abruptly degrades detection performance.
Note that Shape-GD requires a minimum number of
FVs per neighborhood to make robust predictions – at
least 15,000 FVs – hence, the Shape-GD has to set NTWs
based on the rate of incoming requests and access fre-
quency of a particular server. For example, if a server
is not very popular and is likely to be compromised, the
Shape-GD could increase this server’s NTW to collect
more FVs for its neighborhood.
7.2 Fragility of Count GD
A Count-GD algorithm counts the number of alerts
over a neighborhood and compares it to a threshold to
detect malware. This threshold scales linearly in the size
of the neighborhood – we now experimentally quantify
the error Count-GD can tolerate in Symantec Wine (Fig-
ure 10) and waterhole (Figure 11) settings. Note that
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Figure 10: (Symnatec Wine dataset) An error in estimat-
ing neighborhood size dramatically affects Count GD’s
performance. It can tolerate at most 30% underestima-
tion errors and 1% overestimation errors to achieve com-
parable with Shape GD performance.
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Figure 11: (Waterhole attack) An error in estimating
neighborhood size dramatically affects Count GD’s per-
formance. It can tolerate at most 0.1% underestimation
errors and 13.8% overestimation errors to achieve com-
parable with Shape GD performance.
the error in estimating neighborhood size can be double
sided – underestimates (negative error) can make neigh-
borhoods look like alert hotspots and lead to false pos-
itives, while overestimates (positive error) can lead to
missed detections (i.e., lower true positives).
We run Count-GD in the same setting as Shape-GD.
In the Symantec Wine case study we adjust Count-
GD’s threshold to match the performance of Shape-GD’s
Neighborhood classifier (true positive rate of 95.41%,
Section 6.1) with zero neighborhood estimation errors
(Figure 10). In the waterhole case study we evaluate
Count-GD under the same conditions as Shape-GD when
presenting the results of time-based neighborhood filter-
ing (Section 7.1) – 30-sec long neighborhood including
17,178 nodes (Figure 11). In comparison to the Syman-
tec Wine experiment, whose parameters are fixed, in the
waterhole experiment we vary infection probability such
that the number of infected nodes in a neighborhood
changes from 0 to 500 (waterhole) in four increments –
note that only a small fraction (2.9%) of nodes per neigh-
borhood get infected in the worst case.
In this setting, recall that the neighborhood detector
has a maximum global false positive rate of 19.03% and
1% and a true positive rate of 95.41% and 100% respec-
tively in the Symantec Wine and waterhole case stud-
ies. To maintain a similar detection performance, our
experiments show that the Count-GD can only tolerate
neighborhood size estimation errors within a very nar-
row range – [-30%, 1%] (Symantec Wine) and [-0.1%,
13.8%] (waterhole). A key takeaway here is that under-
estimating a neighborhood’s size makes Count-GD ex-
tremely fragile (-30% in Symantec Wine and -0.1% for
waterhole). On the other hand, overestimating neigh-
borhood sizes decreases true positives, and this effect is
catastrophic.
We comment that this effect is important in practice.
In the example of a Fortune-500 company, we observed
that commercial SIEM tools often do not report alerts in
a timely manner and may delay delivering alerts by up
to 2 months due to unpredictable infrastructure failures
and due to a local IT service intervening into the analy-
sis of alerts. Also given the practical deployments where
nodes get infected out of band (e.g., outside the corpo-
rate network), go out of range (with mobile devices), the
tight margins on errors can render Count-GD extremely
unreliable. Even with sophisticated size estimation algo-
rithms, recall that the underlying distributions that create
these neighborhoods (e.g. number of clients per server)
have sub-exponential heavy tails – such distributions typ-
ically result in poor parameter estimates due to lack of
higher moments, and thus, poorer statistical concentra-
tions of estimates about the true value [35]. Circling
back, we see that by eliminating this size dependence
compared to Count-GD, our Shape-GD provides a robust
inference algorithm.
8 Discussion
Evasion attacks. Shape-GD requires a human analyst
to correctly specify attack vectors. If a new attack vec-
tor emerges (ex. badUSB), then the corresponding at-
tack may go undetected. However, attack vectors such
as URLs or emails or physical devices along which mal-
ware propagates are far fewer than vulnerabilities, ex-
ploits, or malware samples. Further, individual local de-
tectors may be susceptible to evasion attacks, which may
negatively affect Shape-GD’s detection. However, de-
signing evasion resistant local detectors [43] is outside
the scope of this paper.
9 Conclusions
Building robust behavioral detectors is a long-standing
problem, especially in large distributed systems where
false positives can be overwhelming. We observe that
attacks on enterprise networks induce low-dimensional
neighborhoods on otherwise high-dimensional feature
vectors, but such neighborhoods are unpredictable and
thus hard to exploit. Shape-GD amplifies malware sig-
nal through neighborhoods and exploits their shape to
identify infected ones early. Automating the search for
13
new neighborhoods, i.e. new attack vectors, that corre-
late with confirmed infections, would be a natural next
step towards deployable behavioral detectors.
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Appendix
A Clustering Results
While Count-GD is fragile, clustering GDs are in-
accurate in the early stages of infection. This is why
prior work [75] uses clustering to (offline) identify high-
priority incidents from security logs for human analysis
(instead of as an alwayWs-on GD) – this use case is com-
plementary to an always-on global detector. We quantify
a recent clustering GD’s [75] detection rate in the wa-
terhole case study as well. We observed similar detec-
tion results (very low AUC metric) in the Symantec Wine
case study.
First, we reduce dimensionality of 390-dimensional
FVs by projecting them on the top 10 PCA components,
which retain 95.72% of the data variance. Second, we
use an adaptation of the K-means clustering algorithm
that does not require specifying the number of clusters
in advance [75, 72, 44]. Specifically, the algorithm con-
sists of the following three steps: (1) select a vector at
random as the first centroid and assign all vectors to this
cluster; (2) find a vector furthest away from its centroid
(following Beehive [75], we use L1 distance) and make
it a center of a new cluster, and reassign every vector to
the cluster with the closest centroid; and (3) repeat step 2
until no vector is further away from its centroid than half
of the average inter-cluster distance.
The evaluation settings of the clustering algorithm
match exactly the settings where Shape-GD detects in-
fected neighborhoods with 99% confidence. Specifi-
cally, the algorithm clusters the data that we collected
in a 17,178-node neighborhood under a waterhole at-
tack within 30 seconds. As we have already demon-
strated (Section 7.1),Shape-GD starts detecting malware
when 107 (waterhole attack) nodes get compromised
(Figure 8).
Clustering does not fare well. It partitions the water-
hole dataset into 30 clusters. We observe three large clus-
ters that aggregate most of the benign FVs. However, the
algorithm fails to find small ’outlying’ clusters consist-
ing of predominantly malicious data. Each cluster heav-
ily mixes benign and malicious data, hence the clustering
approach suffers from poor discriminative ability, i.e. it
is unable to separate malicious and benign samples.
Note the clustering algorithm enforces explicit order-
ing across the clusters. That is, the algorithm forms a
new cluster around an FV that is furthest away from its
cluster centroid. Thus, earlier a cluster is created, the
more suspicious it is. By design of the clustering al-
gorithm, the clusters are subject to a deeper analysis in
order of their suspiciousness. Such an inherent order-
ing allows us to build a receiver operating curve (Figure
12) and compute a typical metric for a binary classifier
– Area Under the Curve (AUC) by averaging across 10
runs. The AUC reaches only 48.3% in the waterhole case
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Figure 12: (Waterhole case study) Receiver operating
curve shows detection accuracy of the clustering-based
malware detector [75]. Its Area Under the Curve (AUC)
parameter averaged for 10 runs reaches only 48.3%; such
low AUC value makes it unusable as a global detector.
study.
This experiment illustrates the failure of the traditional
recipe of dimensionality reduction plus clustering. There
is a fundamental reason for this – the neighborhoods we
seek to detect are small compared to the total number
of nodes in the system. Optimization-based algorithms
that exploit density, including K-Means and related al-
gorithms, fail to detect small clusters in high dimensions,
even under dimensionality reduction. The reason is that
the dimensionality reduction is either explicitly random
(e.g., as in Johnson-Lindenstrauss type approaches), or,
if data-dependent (like PCA), it is effectively indepen-
dent of small clusters, as these represent very little of the
energy (the variance) of the overall data. Spectral clus-
tering style algorithms [69, 56, 25] are also notoriously
unable to deal with highly unbalanced sized clusters, and
in particular, are unable to find small clusters.
Shape-GD also reduces dimensionality but does so af-
ter neighborhood filtering. This amplifies the impact of
small neighborhoods. The combination of dimension-
ality reduction, small-neighborhood-amplification, and
then aggregation represents a novel approach to this de-
tection problem, and our experiments validate this intu-
ition.
B Shape-GD Classifiers
In both case studies local detectors (LDs) analyze ex-
ecutable files, however, they use different file abstrac-
tions – static file analysis (Symantec Wine) because the
original files are unavailable and dynamic traces of exe-
cuted system calls (waterhole case study). Both LD al-
gorithms leverage the state-of-the-art techniques in auto-
mated malware detection. Specifically, the LD algorithm
uses both its internal state and the current feature vector
(FV) to generate an alert if it thinks that this FV corre-
sponds to malware.
Despite performing case study specific feature extrac-
tion, LDs employ similar algorithms as a binary classi-
fier for malware detection: Boosted Decision Trees [24]
(Symantec Wine case study) and Random Forest (water-
hole case study). These algorithms achieve the best per-
formance on the training data set among the classifiers
from a prior survey [23] and scale up well to process mil-
lions of FVs.
Symantec Wine. We adapt an LD from the prior
work [53]. It primarily relies on a lightweight file analy-
sis, which scales well when processing millions of down-
loads per day. Specifically, the LD extracts syntactic fea-
tures from a file and applies a binary classification algo-
rithm that labels a file as either malicious or benign.
The LD is designed to run existing commercial tools
such as TRID, ClamAV, Symantec on a binary file, an-
alyze statically imported libraries and functions, detect
common packers, check whether a file is digitally signed
or not, and collect its binary metadata. VirusTotal pro-
vides outputs of these tools as a single file-level report,
which we directly use as LD’s input.
Waterhole. In the waterhole case study, the LD ana-
lyzes system calls executed by a program. It transforms
continuously evolving 390-dimensional time-series of
Windows system calls into a discrete-time sequence of
feature-vectors (FVs). This is accomplished by chunk-
ing the continuous time series into r−second intervals,
and representing the system call trace over each interval
as a single L−dimensional vector. L is typically a low
dimension, reduced down from 390 using PCA analysis,
to (in our experiments) L = 10 and r = 1 second.
Domain name classifier. In addition to file-level LDs,
we employ a domain name classifier in the Symantec
Wine case study to extract attributes to form neighbor-
hoods. The domain name classifier analyzes VirusTo-
tal domain reports and identifies domains that are likely
to distribute malicious files. It uses as input VirusTo-
tal domain-level reports that aggregate domain classifi-
cation produced by other commercial tools such as Dr.
Web, Websense ThreatSeeker, and VirusTotal. Each of
those tools categorizes a domain based on its content.
The number of categories ranges from 55 (Dr. Web) up
to 451 (VirusTotal), and they include such classes as so-
cial networks, banking, ads, government and etc.
The domain-name classifier applies one-hot encoding
schema to represent categorical data as a fixed length fea-
ture vectors. Specifically, it creates a ”zero” feature vec-
tor with the number of elements equal to the total num-
ber of categories (767-dimensional feature vectors in our
case) and sets ”one” in the positions corresponding to the
assigned categories, which are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.
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C Vector-Histogram Implementation
In the Symantec Wine case study, Shape-GD deals
with two types of alert-FVs: file and domain alert-FVs.
Thus, it builds two separate vector histograms per neigh-
borhood and then concatenates them into a single vector
histogram. The file-level vector histogram has dimen-
sionality of 10x50, i.e. each file alert-FV is projected
on 10-dimensional basis and binned into 50 bins along
each dimension. Similarly, a domain vector-histogram
has dimensionality of 100x5, i.e. each domain alert-FV
is projected on 100-dimensional basis and binned into 5
bins along each dimension. Then, the algorithm concate-
nates two matrix-shaped vector-histograms. To do that,
it represents them as two 500 dimensional vectors by us-
ing a row-major order and appends the second one to the
first one, thus, the resulting vector has 1,000 dimensions.
In the waterhole experiment, Shape-GD projects alert-
FVs on 10-dimensional basis, bins projections into 50
bins along each dimension. Thus, a vector-histogram has
dimensionality of 10x50.
D ShapeScore
We developed the Wasserstein-based distance –
ShapeScore function – to detect neighborhoods with
high malware concentration. ShapeScore quantifies how
much a current vector-histogram, HB, differs from a ref-
erence histogram, Href, which is generated during the
training phase using only the false positive FVs of the
LDs by following the procedure for generating a vector
histogram, which is outlined in Section 4.3. ShapeScore
is thus the distance of a neighborhood from a benign ref-
erence histogram – a high score indicates potential mal-
ware.
The ShapeScore of the accumulated set of FVs, B, is
given by the sum of the coordinate-wise Wasserstein dis-
tances [67] between
HB = (HB(1) HB(2) . . . HB(L))
and
Href = (Href(1) Href(2) . . . Href(L)).
In other words,
ShapeScore =
L
∑
l=1
dW (HB(l),Href(l)),
where for two scalar distributions p,q, the Wasserstein
distance [67, 16] is given by
dW (p,q) =
b
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣ i∑j=1(p( j)−q( j))
∣∣∣∣∣ .
This Wasserstein distance serves as an efficiently com-
putable one dimensional projection, that gives us a dis-
criminatively powerful metric of distance [67, 20]. Be-
cause the Wasserstein distance computes a metric be-
tween distributions – for us, histograms normalized to
have total area equal to 1 – it is invariant to the number
of samples that make up each histogram. Thus, unlike
count-based algorithms, it is robust to estimation errors
in community size.
Finally, to determine whether a neighborhood has mal-
ware present Shape-GD performs hypothesis testing. If
ShapeScore is greater than a threshold γ , Shape-GD de-
clares a global alert, i.e., the algorithm predicts that
there is malware in the neighborhood. The robustness
threshold γ is computed via standard confidence interval
or cross-validation methods with multiple sets of false-
positive FVs.
E Symantec Wine: Real-Time Detection
Though we do not discuss real-time detection results
in the main text, we designed Shape-GD to act as a real-
time detector. In this section we do a deep dive into the
real-time detection in terms of individual files and com-
promised machines. We compare Shape-GD against the
local detectors [53] and we also present neighborhood
detector’s results for completeness to better understand
Shape-GD’s real-time detection. Unfortunately, we have
to exclude from the comparison the downloader detec-
tor [49] because it is not designed to be a real-time de-
tector and the authors did not share the source code with
us. We use the standard metrics for comparison: preci-
sion, recall, and F-1 score.
E.1 File-level real-time detection
We start with the analysis of the temporal distribu-
tion of the download events (Figure E.1) to visualize
file downloads over time. Every time Shape-GD runs,
it analyzes download events within a neighborhood time
window (NTW), which is set to 150 days in our exper-
iments. Therefore, we represent the intensity of down-
loads over time as the number of downloads within each
NTW. Specifically, for each timestamp we compute the
total number and the number of malicious file downloads
within the previous NTW (the upper Figure E.1). For ex-
ample, the value on the Figure E.1 labeled as 01/2011
includes file downloads from 06/2010 till 01/2011. We
also visualize the total number of distinct downloads and
the number of distinct malicious downloads (the lower
Figure E.1).
Every point on these curves characterizes the number
of files Shape-GD has to deal with when operating in
a real-time detection mode. The large gap between the
black and the red curves shows that only a small percent-
age of files in the Symantec Wine dataset is malicious.
Shape-GD manages to filter out most benign files from
further analysis to reduce the overall false positive rate.
When taking a deeper look at the plots, we notice that
file downloads in the Wine dataset exhibit a nonuniform
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Figure 13: File-level dynamic behavior. Left to Right: Raw statistics, LD-level stat, NBD-level stat, Shape-LD - level
stat
pattern over time. The total number of downloads in-
creases from January 2008 and reaches its peak (51 mil-
lion downloads per NTW) within the NTW ending in Oc-
tober 2010, and after that it decreases over time. The
temporal pattern of distinct downloads slightly differs –
intensity of distinct downloads reaches a flat plato (4.74
million per NTW) in September 2010 and remains on
the approximately same level until April 2011. How-
ever, malicious files are responsible for only the small
percentage of all downloads – at most 1.43 million to-
tal malicious downloads and at most 27 thousand unique
malicious downloads.
Note that the low intensive ends of the distribution
impose an obstacle for Shape-GD because of the in-
sufficient number of correlated file downloads. Due to
this reason we discard file downloads before June 2008.
Therefore we run Shape-GD the first time on the neigh-
borhood window spanning the interval from 06/2008 un-
til 01/2009 and label the results with the ‘01/2009’ times-
tamp.
Local detectors. When we analyze the temporal be-
havior of local detectors (Figure E.1), we notice anti-
correlation between the total number of unique down-
loads and LDs’ precision. The peak of unique downloads
corresponds to the large number of benign downloads.
Therefore, when LDs process them, they output a large
number of false positive alerts, which results in a preci-
sion drop (it drops down to less than 5% level). However,
the recall stays in the range of 84% – 95% because it de-
pends only on LDs’ ability to detect malicious files. F-1
score leans more towards precision than to recall, that is
why LDs have mostly low F-1 score over the large period
of time (between 9% and 66%).
Neighborhood detector. Before analyzing Shape-GD
real-time detection, we briefly discuss the neighborhood
detector’s detection performance. We assume that the
neighborhood detector (Figure E.1) labels all the files
within malicious neighborhoods as malicious. As local
detectors, the neighborhood detector suffers from low
precision as well, however, the underlying cause is dif-
ferent. The neighborhood classifier is supposed to label
neighborhoods malicious if they contain more than 5% of
malicious files. Usually, most files in a neighborhood are
benign. Thus, when the neighborhood detector conser-
vatively labels all the files malicious, it suffers from high
false positive rate, consequently, low precision. Hence,
the neighborhood detector is designed to be conservative.
Also the neighborhood detector inadvertently filters out
some malicious files, which leads to lower than LDs’ re-
call.
Shape-GD. Comparing to local detectors, Shape-GD
boosts precision and inherits slightly lower recall from
the neighborhood classifier because it aggregates LDs’
predictions collected only across suspicious neighbor-
hoods (Figure E.1). The reason why Shape-GD achieves
high precision is because it has much lower false positive
rate as many benign files are already filtered out by the
neighborhood detector. Thus LDs running within sus-
picious neighborhoods analyze fewer benign files than
LDs in the traditional deployment scenario. At the same
time, Shape-GD has slightly lower recall than both LDs
and the neighborhood detector because Shape-GD labels
a file as malicious only if it is contained within a suspi-
cious neighborhood and a local detector raises a file-level
alert. However, the neighborhood and domain name clas-
sifiers are imperfect – they may fail to correctly label ma-
licious neighborhoods and domains respectively. There-
fore, Shape-GD does not aggregate LDs’ output across
all malicious files, which results in a slightly lower re-
call. Shape-GD’s F-1 score is bounded by close values of
precision and recall and it is much higher than the analo-
gous parameter of local detectors and the neighborhood
detector.
To quantitatively compare Shape-GD with local detec-
tors we compute the area under F-1 curve. In the case of
file detection, Shape-GD achieves 96.6% higher area un-
der F-1 curve than the local detector. Shape-GD’s F-1
score is bounded by close values of precision and recall
and it is much higher than the analogous parameter of
local detectors and the neighborhood detector.
Machine-level real-time detection. Machine-level
statistics (Figure E.1) is similar to the file-level statistics
– only a small percentage of machines is compromised
within each NTW window. The number of machines and
compromised machines reach their peak values of 1.43
million and 126.9 thousand respectively in October 2010,
i.e. less than 8.9% of compromised machines at the peak.
Overall, we observe higher values of precision and re-
call for all detectors (Figure 14) because, when interpret-
ing detection results at the machine level, the detectors
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Figure 14: Machine-level dynamic behavior. Left to Right: Raw statistics, LD-level stat, NBD-level stat, Shape-LD -
level stat
Parameter
Prior Work 
[CCS’15]
Local Detectors 
[DIMVA’16]
Neighborhood
Detector
Shape Detector
Clean machines 3,753,931
Compromised machines 768,525
False Positives, machines
282,203 862,434 2,991,981 433,015
7.51% 22.97% 79.70% 11.53%
True Positives (Recall)
98,112 670,164 739,558 651,025
12.76% 87.20% 96.23% 84.71%
Precision 25.80% 43.73% 19.82% 60.06%
F-1 score 17.08% 58.25% 32.87% 70.28%
Time to Detection, days 84.26 0 20.63 28.67
Figure 15: Machine-level aggregate analysis.
do not have to be very precise – they need to detect at
least one malicious file on a machine, and file-level false
positives on a particular machine do not count if that ma-
chine is infected.
Similar to file-level detection results, local detectors
suffer from low precision because of the high number
of false positives. However, precision is significantly
higher – its mean value reaches 41% as opposed to the
mean value of 19% for the file-level detection. Such dra-
matic difference is attributed to file-level false positives
on compromised machines not affecting detectors’ pre-
cision at a machine-level. In both cases, recall curve ex-
hibits similar behaviors.
We observe a similar trend for the neighborhood de-
tector – the mean precision value is 48% versus 12.5% in
the case of file-level detection. The recall value remains
in the range of 36% – 92%. Finally, Shape-GD brings
the precision curve up at the cost of slightly lowering the
recall – this is exactly the same effect that we see in the
case of file-level malware detection.
Overall, Shape-GD achieves better results at the
machine-level than at the file-level, which means that it
can identify infected machines earlier and more robustly
than individual malware samples. In the case of real-
time detection, the main Shape-GD’s competitor is a lo-
cal detector. However, Shape-GD’s area under F-1 curve
is 28.6% higher than the analogous parameter for the lo-
cal detector.
F Aggregate Machine-level Detection
In the main text we present file-level aggregate results.
For completeness here we describe machine-level detec-
tion results as well, however, we mainly focus our atten-
tion on the new trends unobserved at the file-level. As
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Figure 16: (Waterhole attack) Comparing to pure time-
based NF, structural filtering algorithm improves Shape
GD’s performance by 3.75× – 5.8× by aggregating
alerts on a server basis.
before, we consider a machine to be compromised (or
infected) if it has downloaded at least one malicious file.
Note Shape-GD is meant to be a file detector, not the
machine level detector.
False positive rate. We notice two opposite trends. First,
the machine-level false positive rate is higher in compar-
ison to the file-level FP rate for all detectors because if
detectors mislabel a single benign file, this may dramat-
ically affect false positive rate if the file has been down-
loaded on multiple clean machines, i.e. those machines
become false positives. Second, if we do detectors’ pair-
wise comparison in terms of false positives, we notice
that their relative FP rates becomes more different. For
example, the downloader detector has only 1.53 times
lower FP rate than Shape-GD at the machine level in
comparison to 7.1 time difference at the file level. The
downloader detector’s results worsen mainly because the
detector often mislabels benign files that are frequently
downloaded on multiple clean machines, so those ma-
chines are considered as false positives. Surprisingly, the
neighborhood detector’s FP rate reaches almost 80% and
makes it completely unusable – due to this reason we ex-
clude it from the further discussion.
True positive rate. In comparison to the FP rate, the
TP rate does not exhibit a single trend – the direction, in
which it moves, depends on a particular detector. The
downloader detector’s TP rate drops down by almost
3 times because the majority of machines in the Wine
dataset is infected by non-downloaders (malware that
does not download other files). As a result, the down-
loader detector misses almost 87% of infected machines.
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Shape-GD’s TP rate demonstrates the opposite trend
– it increases in comparison to the file-level detection
by 6.7% because Shape-GD searches for correlated ma-
licious downloads and thus it is likely to detect similar
malware that infects multiple machines. As a result, spa-
tial correlations between malware downloads boost de-
tection results – they raise from 78.03% up to 84.71%.
F-1 score. Overall, Shape-GD achieves the best FP/TP
trade-off – the highest F-1 score (60.06%). The down-
loader detector demonstrates the poorest detection results
– the lowest F-1 score (17.08%) – mainly due to low its
low TP rate.
Time to detection. We observe that average time to
detection slightly increases for Shape-GD (from 20.33
days up to 28.67 days), but it is almost 3 times lower
than the same parameter of the downloader detector be-
cause Shape-GD makes a decision regarding a file with-
out waiting until it downloads other files.
G Time to Detection Using Structural In-
formation
Waterhole attack imposes a logical structure on nodes
(beyond their time of infection): it infects only the clients
that access a compromised server. This structure sug-
gests that temporal neighborhoods can be further refined
based on the specific server accessed by a client (i.e.,
grouping clients that visit a server into one neighbor-
hood).
To analyze the effect of such structural filtering on
GD’s performance, we vary filtering from coarse- (no
structural filtering, only time-based filtering) to fine-
grained (aggregating alerts across clients accessing each
server separately) (Figures 16). Specifically, the aggre-
gation parameter changes from 50 servers down to 1. As
before, we measure detection in terms of the minimum
number of infected nodes that lead to raising a global
alert. Also we consider three NTW values – 25-, 50-,
and 100-sec long.
Structural filtering improves time to detection by
5.82x, 4.07x, and 3.75x for 25-, 50-, 100-sec long win-
dows respectively. Interestingly, structural filtering re-
quires Shape-GD to use longer NTWs than before –
small NTWs (such as 6 seconds from the last sub-
section) no longer supply a sufficient number of alert-
FVs for Shape-GD to operate robustly. Even though
structural filtering with a 25 second NTW improves de-
tection by 5.82x over temporal filtering with 25 second
NTWs, the number of infected nodes at detection time
is 139.9 – higher than the 107 infected nodes for tempo-
ral filtering with a 6 second NTW (Figure 9). Temporal
and structural filtering thus present different trade-offs
between detection time and work performed by Shape-
GD – their relative performance is affected by the rate at
which true and false positive FVs are generated.
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